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In a competitive electricity market, nodal pricing is the most efﬁcient way to manage congestion.
Counter-trading is inefﬁcient as it gives the wrong long term signals for entry and exit of power plants.
However, in a non-competitive market, additional entry will improve the competitiveness of the
market, and will increase social beneﬁt by reducing price–cost margins. This paper studies whether the
potential pro-competitive entry effects could make counter-trading more efﬁcient than nodal pricing.
We ﬁnd that this is unlikely to be the case, and expect counter-trading to have a negative effect on
overall welfare. The potential beneﬁts of additional competition (more competitive prices and lower
production cost) do not outweigh the distortions (additional investment cost for the entrant, and
socialization of the congestion cost to ﬁnal consumers).
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under the Elsevier OA license. 1. Introduction
Internal congestion on the high and medium voltage transmis-
sion network is becoming a structural problem in several regions
in Europe. For instance, in the Netherlands, congestion required
the government to change its regulatory framework in 2009
(Hakvoort et al., 2009). Congestion within Sweden (and pressure
from the European Commission) obliged the Swedish network
operator in 2010 to subdivide the Swedish electricity market into
several zones.1
The current legal systems have not been designed to deal with
this type of problems as national physical network constraints
were often neglected by policy makers. The further integration of
green energy and larger energy ﬂows as the consequence of
international trade into the system make it harder for policy
makers to neglect these physical constraints. Hence, new regula-
tory frameworks need to be implemented to solve the congestion
problem.
There are several ways to deal with congestion. The theoreti-
cally most efﬁcient congestion management method recognizes
the physical limitations of the network and creates regional (or
nodal) electricity markets. Such a method is for instance used in
the PJM market (nodal spot pricing). Under nodal spot pricing,
electricity prices reﬂect physical constraints, i.e. the capacity
limits of the transmission lines and Kirchoff’s laws, and hence,
scarcity of the transmission network. In the short run, nodal spotB. Willems).
pril 2010, IP/10/425.
sevier OA license. prices therefore ensure optimal usage of the transmission net-
work. In the long run, they give the optimal incentives for new
investments. This is the option that Svenska Kraftna¨t, the Swedish
network operator, will follow.
An alternative way to manage internal congestion is a system
of counter-trading. Under this method, once congestion is obser-
ved in the network, the network operator will counter-trade
against the ﬂow of congestion, thereby reducing the ﬂow over
the line, until the congestion is eliminated. This system might be
preferred to nodal pricing if congestion problems are expected to
last only for a limited number of years (transmission investments
will reduce congestion), and implementing nodal spot pricing is
considered to be too cumbersome or too costly. This systemmight
also be politically more acceptable. Introducing nodal spot pricing
will often involve transfers between agents that are much greater
than the net welfare gain. This is likely to make its introduction
hard from a political point of view (Green, 2007). Counter-trading
reduces those transfers. It was chosen as the regulatory frame-
work to deal with congestion in the Netherlands.
In a perfectly competitive market, nodal spot pricing is the
most efﬁcient way to deal with congestion. Counter-trading is
inefﬁcient as it gives the wrong long term signals for entry and
exit of power plants, and hence, causes over-entry in export
constrained areas and under-entry in import constrained areas. In
a non-competitive (oligopolistic) market, entry will improve the
competitiveness of the market, and will increase total social
surplus. Since under counter-trading entrants in the export
constraint area receive an implicit subsidy, there will be more
entry, the level of competition in the market might increase, and
the price–cost margin will reduce. When the Dutch Ministry of
Economic Affairs proposed to introduce counter-trading it argued
3 There are some exceptions. For instance, Italy and Norway have price zones
which are considerably smaller than the whole country.
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the potential negative inefﬁciency effects (MinEZ, 2008a, 2008b).
We study whether this competitive entry effect makes coun-
ter-trading more efﬁcient than market splitting (i.e. nodal pri-
cing).2 To achieve this goal, we build a stylized electricity market
model that endogenizes the entry decision in the export con-
strained area, and derive the welfare effect of additional entry
caused by counter-trading. All along we assume that there is no
effect on entry in the import constrained area. Taking this
potential negative effect on competition of counter-trading (less
entry compared to nodal pricing) into account, would only
strengthen our result that any competitive beneﬁts of counter-
trading are outweighed by the loss in efﬁciency.
We consider an electricity market with two regions which are
connected with a congested transmission line. An incumbent ﬁrm
is active in both regions, demand is present in one region (the
import constrained zone) and the entrant, if it incurs an entry
cost, can invest in the other region (the export constrained zone).
If it invests, the entrant, which is assumed to be more efﬁcient
than the incumbent, will displace the production of the incum-
bent in the export constrained zone.
Under nodal pricing and perfect competition, entry into the
electricity market is efﬁcient as the entrant’s private beneﬁt of
entry is equal to the social beneﬁt of entry. Counter-trading, on
the other hand, implies an implicit subsidy to entrants in the
export constrained area (and potentially a tax in the import
constrained area) whenever the market is congested. Entrants
will therefore overinvest in the export constrained region and
underinvest in the import constrained area. Hence, in a compe-
titive market, counter-trading reduces total surplus as locational
investment incentives are distorted.
If ﬁrms have market power, additional entry in the export
constrained area might have a positive effect on total surplus by
improving the competitiveness of the sector. We test whether it
outweighs the aforementioned reduction in total surplus. In the
framework of our model we ﬁnd the following results:
First, we study the effect of entry when the transmission line is
congested. With nodal pricing, entry in the export constrained
zone will lower the price in the import constrained zone. When
the entrant invests, the incumbent’s imports are displaced by the
entrant’s, the inframarginal rents of the incumbent decrease, and
its incentives to raise prices are mitigated. Although the invest-
ment incentives of the entrant are larger with counter-trading,
the pro-competitive effect does not exist, because the incumbent
receives a compensation for its displaced capacity in the export
constrained area. Hence, nodal pricing has a larger pro-competi-
tive effect and is better from a social viewpoint.
Second, we show that during the hours without congestion,
additional entry will make the market more competitive, but, also
ﬁnd that the competitive effect does not outweigh the additional
investment cost that the entrant incurs and that subsidizing entry
is socially not optimal. Combining the results for congested and
non-congested hours, it is evident that nodal pricing is socially
preferred to counter-trading.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the literature on nodal spot pricing and counter-trading.
In Section 3, the stylized electricity market model is introduced.
Section 4 analyzes the welfare effects of counter-trading and
nodal spot pricing on both the perfectly competitive and the
oligopolistic electricity market. Section 5 concludes.2 This paper focuses on the competitive effect of entry, assuming that one ﬁrm
is already present in the market. Petropoulos and Willems (2009) study the
dynamic effect of entry in a multi-period setting with sequential entry by strategic
ﬁrms. They consider both the ﬁrst-mover advantage of entry and the option value
of waiting.2. Literature review
The concept of nodal spot pricing on electricity markets
originates from the work of Schweppe et al. (1988). In the short
run, nodal spot pricing ensures that regional prices reﬂect
physical constraints (i.e. congestion on the transmission lines),
and hence, scarcity on the transmission network. Therefore, nodal
spot prices ensure optimal usage of the transmission network in
the short run (Hogan, 1992).
The Pennsylvania–New Jersey–Maryland (PJM) Interconnection
introduced nodal pricing in April 1998. The PJM market encom-
passes the movement of wholesale electricity in 13 US states (some
partially) and the District of Columbia. This market has a spot
market coordinated by an independent system operator (ISO). The
ISO gathers both the bilateral schedules and the voluntary bids of
the market participants, and determines the associated locational
marginal cost prices (while accounting for security-constrained
dispatch of the power ﬂows). When the transmission system is
constrained, the spot prices can differ substantially across locations.
The transmission charge for bilateral transactions is given by the
difference in the locational prices between origin and destination.
An accompanying system of ﬁxed transmission rights (FTR) pro-
vides ﬁnancial hedges between locations (Hogan, 1998).
In Western Europe, full nodal congestion pricing is not used.
Prices are imposed to be uniform within a country,3 and price
differences between zones reﬂect, more or less, cross-border
congestion. In order to deal with congestion within a country,
counter-trading is used. This market based approach allocates
scarce transmission capacity among the different market players.
Under counter-trading, ﬁrms are paid for not producing in the
export constrained area. Also in the Nordic countries, such a
system is used. Zonal prices reﬂect inter-zonal constraints, and
counter-trading is implemented when the network operator is
faced with intra-zonal congested paths (Bjørndal et al., 2003).
A standard counter-trading scheme works (approximately) as
follows: First, based on the supply and demand schedule bids of the
market participants on the spot market, the market is cleared while
ignoring any grid limitations. Second, the network operators check
where generation on the grid has to be reduced or increased, so that
congestion can be relieved. Third, these increases and decreases in
generation are determined using a separate balancing market.
Generators offer transmission adjustment bids on this market.
Fourth, the system operator selects the least expensive bids for
increases and decreases in generation and pays the respective
generators. Hence, some generators are constrained-off and com-
pensated with the equilibrium price of the market for generation
reductions, whereas others are constrained on and receive the
equilibrium price for generation increases.4
It is clear that this mechanism induces costs for the system
operator, since he has to buy and resell energy according to the
adjustment bids of the generators. On the Nordic market, these
counter-trading costs are ﬁnanced through the ﬁxed charges of
the network tariff, i.e., the costs are socialized (Bjørndal et al.,
2003; Hakvoort et al., 2009).
Under such a system, it is plausible that uniform prices may lead
to suboptimal dispatching of power plants.5 Green (2007) shows4 As a referee correctly pointed out, in some markets generators are paid in
accordance with a pay-as-bid rule and not the market price when they are
constrained-off.
5 As noted by one of the referees, counter-trading can lead to an optimal
short-run dispatch, if all consumers and generators are able to participate in the
counter-trading market. In practice, however, (small) consumers are often unable
to participate.
7 Another example of strategic behavior is given in Ofgem (2009). When NETA
was extended to Scotland via the BETTA arrangements in 2005, concerns over
possible market abuse arising from constraints between England/Wales and
Scotland have been raised on several occasions. Ofgem launched a formal
investigation into the behavior of ScottishPower and Scottish & Southern Energy
in April 2008, and found that the two companies may have withheld generation
plant from the spot market while using the same plant to supply balancing power
at excessive prices.
8 See for instance, Ku¨pper and Willems (2010) for a discussion on how a
monopolist, on a market characterized by market splitting, might create conges-
tion when it has production capacity on both ends of a possibly congested line.
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which do not reﬂect transmission constraints may reduce welfare
with a few percentage points. However, taking into account the long-
term effects on investment decisions and the occurrence of strategic
behavior may increase the negative effects of uniform prices and
counter-trading. The combination of zonal prices and counter-
trading has been criticized by several authors.
Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) show that it is impossible to
deﬁne transmission capacity on cross-border transmission lines
uniquely. Using a simple six-node model in which only two lines
have limited capacities, they show that zones can be constructed
in different ways. The number of possible zones becomes sub-
stantial in the meshed part of the continental submarket of
Europe where many line capacities may be binding. Hence, the
authors argue that choosing ‘good’ zones may be a difﬁcult and
important problem. Furthermore, freezing of zones is not a
solution, because the characteristics of ‘good’ partitioning may
change over time (cf. Stoft, 1997).
Bjørndal (2000) and Bjørndal and Jo¨rnsten (2001) study how
an electricity network can be optimally divided in a limited set of
price zones. They show that an optimal deﬁnition of zones
requires the solution of a complex integer optimization problem.
They argue that contrary to the belief that the zonal approach is
easier to put into practice, implementing zonal pricing is more
complex than implementing nodal spot pricing.
Supporters of the zonal approach have argued that by using
the zones (and neglecting the physical constraints in the spot
market), ﬁrms face more competitors, and markets become more
competitive. On the other hand, if prices are different at every
node, so must be markets, and therefore, using nodal pricing will
enhance the options of dominant ﬁrms to increase its proﬁts. It
therefore follows that aggregation of several nodes into larger
zones creates competition across a wider area and reduces the
market power of the monopolist (see for instance, Oren et al.,
1995 for this line of argument). Hence, nodal pricing (or geogra-
phically splitting of regions) should be pursued only when there is
enough competition at each node or in each new zone.6 However,
Harvey and Hogan (2000) and Hogan (1999) argue that this
conclusion is incorrect as it ignores poorer incentives for invest-
ment, socializes the higher costs by taxing consumers and
requires payments to generators to reduce supply when inter-
zonal congestion occurs. Those payments may lead to strategic
behavior. Moreover, ﬁrms realize that in the balancing market,
where physical constraints cannot be neglected, they face less
competition and are able to charge prices above the competitive
level. The proﬁt in the balancing market represents an opportu-
nity cost when they bid in the spot market. As a result, ﬁrms will
also bid less competitive in the spot market. Hence, using a zonal
approach does not necessarily improve competition.
The fact that ﬁrms might behave strategically in the wholesale
market in combination with reserve/ancillary markets, has been
well documented. In order to address such forms of localized
market power, regulators often rely on special forms of regula-
tion. In California, reliability must-run (RMR) contracts were
imposed on generation plants with a high risk of market power
abuse. However, Wolak and Bushnell (1999) show that even those
RMR contracts did not solve all market power abuses. The
presence of the RMR market made it more proﬁtable for the ﬁrms
to behave non-competitively in the spot and ancillary markets. By
withholding capacity in the spot market (and the ancillary
market) and submitting higher priced bids, ﬁrms can increase
the spot market price (and the price for ancillary services). At the6 Note that the discussion in the Netherlands focused on how zonal pricing
could improve competition not by creating larger markets, but by new entry.same time,this behavior will increase the likelihood of being able
to sell in the RMR market and puts positive pressure on the RMR
contract prices.7
In our paper we argue that counter-trading leads to strategic
bidding by generators. The idea is that ﬁrms in the export
constrained area will have an incentive to bid a very low price
in the energy market to be sure that congestion will be created,
and hence, receive a payment for not producing under a counter-
trading scheme. This method of strategic bidding may reduce
market efﬁciency. Also in the import constrained region, ﬁrms
might adjust their bids strategically. The intuition is that the ﬁrms
in the import constrained area will understand that, due to
internal congestion, their production capacity becomes more
valuable in the importing region as their production plants have
an increased opportunity to be called upon in the counter-trading
market. As a result those generators will increase their bids in the
spot market. The reason is that the opportunity cost of their
production plants has increased. Moreover, these effects might be
aggravated if ﬁrms strategically create congestion by withholding
capacity in the import constrained area, and scheduling more
capacity in the export constrained area.8
The overall price effect of strategic bids under counter-trading
is undetermined. Some ﬁrms are bidding lower (in the export
constrained area), and other ﬁrms are bidding higher (in the
import constrained area). Therefore, it may be that the total
supply function does not change fundamentally, and hence, prices
on the market could remain fairly constant.
There are several papers modeling the possibility of strategic
behavior under nodal pricing. Borenstein et al. (2000) ﬁnd that
under nodal pricing limited transmission capacity can give a ﬁrm
the incentive to restrict its output in order to congest transmis-
sion into its area of dominance. Gilbert et al. (2004) and Joskow
and Tirole (2000) discuss how different mechanisms for allocating
transmission capacity (such as physical transmission rights, and
nodal pricing with ﬁnancial transmission rights) affect market
power in the wholesale market sector.9
There are however few papers modeling market power under
counter-trading. One exception is Hers et al. (2009) who develop
numerical simulation models of the European electricity market
to compare different types of congestion management schemes.
They ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of introducing re-dispatch outweigh
the costs of the status quo situation in which no ﬁrms would be
allowed to enter the market. The study differs from our study in
three important aspects: (1) the entry decisions of the entrants
are taken as given, (2) the standard nodal pricing model is not
considered as a scenario; instead different variants of the counter-
trading model are compared, and (3) the strategic incentives of
generators are taken into account by studying the proﬁtability of
sensible but ad-hoc deviations of the competitive benchmark.
We have a much simpler set-up, but try to provide more in-depth
intuition for the strategic and entry effects.9 Numerical simulation models can also be used to model market power in the
electricity market. See for instance Boucher and Smeers (2001), Hobbs et al. (2004)
and Wei and Smeers (1999). Ventosa et al. (2005) discuss different modeling
techniques, and Neuhoff et al. (2005) compare different numerical Cournot
models.
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behavior of the network operators in systems that combine
market splitting and counter-trading. They show that it is indeed
possible for network operators to replace a real intra-zonal
constraint by a fake constraint on an inter-zonal line. The
incentive for the network operator is that he does not have to
pay for the costs of counter-trading this way. The incentive to
move the constraint under such a system exists also for the
market participants. They are faced with decreased transmission
tariffs when counter-trading costs are eliminated, and might also
be able to change the zonal prices when a real intra-zonal
constraint is replaced by a fake constraint on an inter-zonal line.3. Model
This section presents a stylized model of an electricity market
with congestion. We consider an electricity market with one
small export constrained area and one large import constrained
area that are connected by a transmission line with a capacity for
K units of electricity (see Fig. 1). The import constrained area can
be thought of as a densely populated area with a large demand
level but relatively few opportunities for new investments. There
is no demand in the export constrained area, but there is ample
space for new investments. Examples for this set-up could be the
Norwegian electricity market or the England and Wales market:
in both cases, there is cheap generation capacity in the north, but
the main load area is in the south.
An incumbent player is active in both areas of the market,
while an entrant player can only enter in the export constrained
area. Consumers are only present in the import constrained area.
In the export constrained area, the marginal production costs of
the incumbent and the entrant are cI and cE, respectively, with
cEocI . Hence, we assume that the entrant has a cost advantage
compared to the incumbent. This assumption makes it more
likely that entry is beneﬁcial for society, as it will reduce overall
production costs, and therefore, makes it more likely that coun-
ter-trading will socially outperform nodal pricing.
In the export constrained area, the installed generation capa-
cities of the incumbent and the entrant (if it enters) are equal to kI
and kE, respectively, with kI, kE¼k. The ﬁxed cost of entry is given
by F. In the import constrained area, the constant marginal
production cost of the incumbent is given by C4cI. There is no
capacity constraint on production in the import constrained area.
Consumers, who are only present in the import constrained
area, are price takers and pay a price p for their electricity.
Furthermore, we assume that demand is always larger than 2kImport
Constrained Area
Export
Constrained Area
MC = C
q
p
MC = cI
Entry Cost F
KIncumbent Incumbent
Demand
MC = cE
Entrant
Fig. 1. Stylized representation of the market.for the relevant price range that we consider. The price in the
export constrained area will be denoted by pn.
Unless stated otherwise, we assume that the transmission line is
congested, and that only one of the ﬁrms can produce in the export
constrained area (K¼k). If there is congestion, the entrant will
replace k units of the production of the incumbent in the export
constrained area. If there is no regional congestion (K42k), then the
entrant will, as it is more efﬁcient, replace k units of the production
of the incumbent in the import constrained area.4. Analysis
The analysis consists of three steps. We ﬁrst show that under
perfect competition, entry is efﬁcient under nodal pricing, but
inefﬁcient with counter-trading. In the second step, we test
whether the competitive effect of additional entry might offset
the negative effects of inefﬁcient entry for an oligopolistic market.
We show that the entrant does not bring about a pro-competitive
effect under counter-trading, as the incumbent is compensated
for any loss of market power. Hence, nodal pricing outperforms
counter-trading here. In the last step, we assume that the line is
non-congested during some hours of the day, and test whether
the pro-competitive effect during those hours, outweighs the
negative efﬁciency effects. We ﬁnd that, even during the hours
that there is no congestion, the competitive effect of additional
entry is insufﬁcient to justify the introduction of counter-trading.
4.1. Perfect competition
This section shows that, under perfect competition, entry is
efﬁcient with nodal pricing, but inefﬁcient with counter-trading.
In particular, we show that, under counter-trading, the private
incentives to enter are larger than the social ones.
First, we assume that nodal spot pricing is used to manage
congestion. Since the entrant is more efﬁcient, he will replace the
production of the incumbent in the export constrained area and
supply K units of electricity to the import constrained area.
Furthermore, as there is competition in the export constrained
area to sell energy through the transmission line, the ‘nodal’ price
pn in the export constrained area will be equal to the incumbent’s
cost pn¼cI. Fig. 2A shows that the private beneﬁt of entry (the
proﬁt the entrant makes in the spot market minus the entry costs
ðpcEÞKF) is equal to the beneﬁt to society (a reduction in
marginal production costs minus the entry costs: ðcIcEÞKF).
Both are equal to the size of area A minus the ﬁxed entry cost.
Hence, the entrant has the right incentives to enter the market.10
Proposition 1. In a perfectly competitive market, using nodal
pricing to manage congestion, the private beneﬁt of entry is equal
to the beneﬁt to society.
We will now compare nodal pricing with counter-trading. In
this framework, the incumbent and the entrant in the export
constrained area will place ‘cost bids to produce’. The ﬁrm with
the lowest cost bid will produce, and the other ﬁrm will be
compensated for not being able to supply.
Proposition 2. It is a Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium for the
entrant to bid its marginal cost, and for the incumbent to bid slightly
above.
The proof of Proposition 2 is derived in Appendix I. The result
of this equilibrium is presented in Fig. 2B. The incumbent will not
produce and receive a compensation of ðpcEÞK for being unable10 Note that it has to hold that (pn–cE)K4F for the entrant to enter the market.
qD (p)
C
K
p* = cI
cE
q
D (p)
C
K
cI
p* = cE
p, p* p, p
*
p
A A
B
C D
p = p
DWG
p
Fig. 3. Oligopolistic competition with congestion. (A) Nodal pricing and (B) Counter
trading.
q
D (p)
p = C
K
p* = cI
cE
q
D (p)
p = C
K
cI
p* = cE
A
p, p* p, p*
A
B
Fig. 2. Perfect competition with congestion. (A) Nodal pricing and (B) Counter
trading.
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earns its margin on production and receives ðpcEÞKF. This is
the private value of entry. In the ﬁgure, this is equal to the area
A+B minus the ﬁxed cost of entry F.11
Proposition 3. In a perfectly competitive market with counter-trading
the private beneﬁt of entry is larger than the beneﬁt to society.
The social value of entry is equal to the cost savings of having
K units produced more efﬁciently by the entrant minus the
investment costs: ðcEcIÞKF, i.e. area A minus the ﬁxed entry
cost. Hence, the private beneﬁt of entry is larger than the beneﬁt
to society, and there is over-entry under counter-trading.
Furthermore, the costs of counter-trading, i.e. the subsidy to
the incumbent (area A+B), and the additional subsidy to the
entrant (area B) come at a cost for society: Often those costs are
paid for (socialized) by a charge to energy users, and hence, create
welfare reductions in the form of a deadweight loss.12
Summarizing, we show that in a perfectly competitive market,
nodal pricing outperforms counter-trading as the latter gives the
wrong signals for entry (and exit) of power plants. Counter-trading
comes with an additional inefﬁciency if the costs of counter-trading
are socialized. In the following section, we study whether the
competitive entry effect makes counter-trading more efﬁcient than
nodal spot pricing when the market has an oligopolistic nature.4.2. Market power
This section compares the efﬁciency of nodal pricing and
counter-trading when the market is oligopolistic, i.e. there is a
positive price–cost margin p4C in the import constrained area.
Assume that nodal pricing is used as a method to solve
congestion. Again, competition in the export constrained area
will drive down the market price in the export constrained area to
p ¼ cI (see Fig. 3). Given that the entrant is more efﬁcient, he will
replace the production of the incumbent in the export constrained
area and supply K units of electricity to the import constrained
area. The proﬁt of the entrant is equal the proﬁt in the spot
market minus the investment cost: ðcIcEÞKF (area A in Fig. 3A
minus the ﬁxed cost). The incumbent loses market share (its own
imports are displaced by the entrant’s), and therefore will behave
more competitively. Hence, the price drops from the pre-entry
price p^ to the post-entry price p, and the deadweight loss will
decrease. This is indicated with deadweight gain (DWG) in
Fig. 3A. The social beneﬁt of entry is equal to ðcIcEÞKþDWGF.11 Again, as long as (p–cE)K4F, the entrant will ﬁnd it optimal to enter the
market.
12 Given the low short-term demand elasticity, those welfare losses are
expected to be small in the short-run, but can become larger in the long-run
(see Lijesen, 2007).Proposition 4. In an oligopolistic market with nodal pricing, the
private beneﬁt of entry in the export constrained region is smaller
than the beneﬁt to society. Subsidizing entry might be optimal.
Note that the entrant does not beneﬁt from the fact that the
incumbent has market power in the import constrained area (and
the high price p) due to congestion. However, entry reduces the
market share of the incumbent, and reduces its incentives to set
high prices.
Now consider the case in which the incumbent will be
compensated for losing its market share to the more efﬁcient
entrant by the means of counter-trading. For this case, we ﬁrst
examine the effect of entry on the price in the import constrained
area under counter-trading.
Proposition 5. The proﬁt maximizing incumbent in the import
constrained area will not change its behavior on the spot market
post-entry under counter-trading.
A formal proof of Proposition 5 is derived in Appendix II. The
intuition for this result is that the incumbent is being compensated
for losing market share, and therefore will not change its strategic
behavior after entry. The incumbent’s proﬁt before entry is given by
the area B+C+D in Fig. 3B.13 The proﬁt after entry is equal to the
area (A+B+C+D). It consists of two parts: proﬁt for not producing in
the export constrained area (equal to A+B+C) and a proﬁt for
producing in the import constrained area (area D). The incumbent
will set the price p as to maximize its overall surplus.
Hence, given that the incumbent’s behavior does not change,
the post-entry price level p is the same as the pre-entry price p^.
Fig. 3B presents the market equilibrium and the welfare effect of
entry by the more efﬁcient entrant. Since the entrant is more
efﬁcient, he will supply the K units of electricity to the import
constrained area. The private beneﬁt of the entrant is given by
area A+B+C minus the ﬁxed costs of entry, or ðpcEÞKF. The
private beneﬁt of the incumbent is given by the compensation it
receives from the counter-trading scheme and is equal to ðpcEÞK.
Furthermore, note that the competitive pressure does not reduce
the deadweight loss as prices do not change (p¼ p^). However, if
the costs of counter-trading are socialized, this might lead to a
deadweight loss.
Proposition 6. In an oligopolistic market with counter-trading the
private beneﬁt of entry is larger than the beneﬁt to society.
Hence, the result is over-investment. While the private beneﬁt
of the entrant is given by ðpcEÞKF (the area A+B+C minus the
ﬁxed entry cost), the beneﬁt to society of having K units of
electricity produced more efﬁciently after incurring the entry13 Here, we assume that the ﬁrms coordinate on the equilibrium that is Pareto
dominant (see Appendix I).
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ðcIcEÞKFDWL ð1Þ
(or: area A minus the ﬁxed entry cost and the deadweight loss).
Proposition 7. For every realization of the investment cost F of the
entrant, nodal pricing is at least as good as counter-trading.
First, assume that the entrant enters in a regime with nodal
pricing. Then it will for sure enter in a counter-trading regime.
Welfare will be higher under nodal pricing, as the competitive
effect only occurs under nodal pricing (see Proposition 5), and
counter-trading implies an additional deadweight loss.
Second, assume that the entrant does not enter with nodal
pricing. This implies that the cost advantage of the entrant does
not outweigh the investment costs. If in that case the entrant
would enter under counter-trading, total welfare will be lower, as
not only total costs will increase (F4 ðcIcEÞK), but also an
additional deadweight loss is created.
Summarizing, in an oligopolistic market, there will be over-
entry when counter-trading is implemented. When the market is
congested, there is no pro-competitive effect, but counter-trading
introduces extra costs, namely the cost of entry and the cost of
socializing the compensation payments. Nodal pricing always
outperforms counter-trading.
4.3. Competitive effects during non-congested hours
Suppose that congestion is not permanent, but that for some
fraction of the time the transmission line is uncongested. Hence,
the entrant receives an implicit subsidy during the hours that
there is congestion, which increases entry, and additionally, this
subsidy creates a pro-competitive effect during the hours that
there is no congestion. Will counter-trading in this situation be
more efﬁcient than nodal pricing?
Fig. 4 shows the market equilibrium, and the welfare effect of
entry, assuming that the transmission line has a sufﬁciently large
capacity to accommodate both the entrant and the incumbent ﬁrm.
Due to entry, the market becomes more competitive, less
efﬁcient ﬁrms lose market share (kE is now produced by the
entrant instead of the incumbent in the import constrained zone),
and price drops from p^ to p. Since the entrant is more efﬁcient and
does not face any congestion when exporting, it is able to produce
kE, and will make a proﬁt
ðpcEÞkEF ð2Þq
D (p)
C
K
cI
cE
p
p
A
DWG
pˆ
kE kI
B
Fig. 4. Oligopolistic competition without congestion.The social value of entry is given by the reduction in produc-
tion costs (area A+B in Fig. 4) and the deadweight gain (DWG in
Fig. 4) minus the ﬁxed cost of entry F,14 or:
DWGþðCcEÞkEF ð3Þ
Whether the entrant has the right incentives to enter the
market is derived in Appendix III for a simple Cournot model with
n incumbent ﬁrms.
Proposition 8. In a n-ﬁrm oligopolistic market with linear demand
and without congestion, subsidizing entry will only be socially
efﬁcient if the entrant obtains a market share of
1 1
ðnþ1Þ2þ1
Proof: See Appendix III.
For instance, for a market with two oligopolistic ﬁrms (n¼2),
additional entry in the export constrained area should cover at
least 90% of total market demand in order to increase total
surplus. The intuition for this result is simple: The private
incentives of the entrant to enter the market are proportional to
the size of entry, while the pro-competitive effect is only a second
order effect. Hence, for small entrants the pro-competitive effect
is always smaller than the private incentives to enter.
This does not imply that small entry should necessarily reduce
overall welfare: If the investment cost of the entrant is low, then
entry will improve welfare. However, this entrant does not need
to be subsidized to enter the market, as it is already proﬁtable
without subsidy.
Proposition 8 is only valid for linear demand. However, if entry
is sufﬁciently small, then any demand function can be approxi-
mated by a linear one, and entry should never be subsidized. We
cannot derive conditions for general demand functions, but
Appendix III shows that the results hold also for a large range of
parameters under constant elasticity demand functions. Therefore,
we argue that it is very unlikely that the additional entry due to
counter-trading will have a positive effect on total surplus during
the hours that the line is not congested.15 Even if there would be a
positive welfare effect during uncongested hours, this has to be
weighed against the cost of socializing the implicit subsidy.
Proposition 9. Nodal pricing will always outperform counter-trad-
ing if the size of the entrant is small.
First, assume that the entrant does not enter under nodal
pricing, but enters under counter-trading. Welfare will then be
lower under counter-trading than under nodal pricing. The reason
for this is that the private beneﬁt for the ﬁrm under nodal pricing
is an upper limit for welfare under counter-trading.
Second, assume that the entrant enters under nodal pricing. It
will therefore also enter under counter-trading. Also in this case
welfare will be lower under counter-trading for the same reasons
as before: the competitive effect is larger under nodal pricing and
recovering the subsidies creates an additional deadweight loss
under counter-trading.
4.4. Robustness of the results
We have shown that additional entry in the export constrained
area by the introduction of counter-trading is unlikely to improve
total surplus. This result was derived assuming that: (1) the14 As long as (pA–cE)kE4F, the entrant will ﬁnd it optimal to enter the market.
15 Due to the introduction of counter-trading, some ﬁrms will enter the
market that otherwise would not have entered. Those ﬁrms have a relatively high
investment cost, and are less likely to improve overall welfare.
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the import constraint area, (2) entrants in the export constraint
area would behave competitively, and (3) the entrant had a lower
marginal cost than the incumbent. This section shows that when
those assumptions are relaxed our main results are likely to be
reinforced.
First, since locational signals for entry are distorted due to the
implicit subsidy created by counter-trading, it may reduce entry
in regions where ﬁrms do not receive an implicit subsidy.
Additional entry in the export constrained area (due to the
implicit subsidy) will delay investments in the import constrained
area. Those delays might have a signiﬁcant welfare costs as those
investments would have had a competitive effect not only during
the hours where there is no congestion, but also at times when
there is congestion.
Second, in practice, entrants often sign long-term contracts
with the incumbent ﬁrms. By signing those contracts, small
entrants, such as combined heat and power plants, become de-
facto part of incumbent ﬁrms. Hence, the competitive effect of
entry will disappear, and counter-trading will only have a
negative effect on the overall welfare level.
Third, if the entrant has higher marginal costs than the
incumbent, then the entrant might displace production of a more
efﬁcient, but less competitive incumbent. This would make it less
likely for subsidizing entry to be socially optimal.5. Conclusion
This paper compares two mechanisms to manage congestion
in the electricity market: nodal pricing and counter-trading.
Nodal pricing gives efﬁcient long term price signals to ﬁrms with
respect to their investment location, as prices reﬂect the scarcity
of network resources. Compared with nodal pricing, counter-
trading implies an implicit subsidy to ﬁrms in the export
constrained area whenever there is congestion, and an implicit
tax on ﬁrms in the import constrained area. Counter-trading
therefore distorts the long term investment signals. If no other
market imperfections are present, then the regional misallocation
of investments will reduce overall welfare.
In this paper we test whether nodal pricing still outperforms
counter-trading when there is market power in the generation
market. A possible rational for this is the following: With nodal
prices, ﬁrms in export constrained areas pay a higher price for
accessing the network than in import constrained areas. This
price implicitly forms an entry barrier in export constrained areas.
By introducing counter-trading this entry barrier is lowered, and
more ﬁrms will enter in the export constrained area, making the
market more competitive.
With our model, we show that this will not increase overall
welfare: The positive competitive effects of more entry in the
export constrained area do not outweigh the investment cost of
the new ﬁrms. There are three reasons why this is the case:1. With counter-trading, the incumbent ﬁrm is compensated for
the displacement of its imports by the entrant’s. Setting a
higher price in the import constrained zone increases the size
of the compensation it receives. Therefore, the incentives of
the incumbent do not change with entry, and it charges the
same price before and after entry. There is no competitive
effect of counter-trading.2. If there is no congestion, entry has a positive effect on market
power, but subsidizing entry is socially not optimal. The
reason for this is that there is already too much entry without
a subsidy, because the entrant wants to steal the rents of the
incumbent, but rent stealing itself does not improve welfare.3. Counter-trading requires that additional funds are collected
from network users. This creates a deadweight loss for society.
Summarizing: Counter-trading is an inefﬁcient tool to manage
congestion, and an ineffective instrument to promote competition
in the electricity market. It subsidizes entry at locations where it
is least needed, i.e. at those parts of the network with a generation
surplus.
We therefore suggest that regulators and governments should
seriously consider the introduction of a nodal (or zonal) pricing
model (cf. Sweden) as an alternative to a counter-trading model
(cf. the Netherlands).
Furthermore, when promoting ‘green energy’ investments in
generation, governments might be tempted to interfere with the
congestion management scheme and give additional beneﬁts to
‘green electrons’ on the network. We are convinced that replacing
nodal pricing with counter-trading as a way to subsidize green
energy is inefﬁcient. Counter-trading acts as an implicit subsidy
both to the entrant and the incumbent. Offering a subsidy only to
the green producers would reduce the overall costs for reaching
the goal of subsidizing green energy. Counter-trading implies a
subsidy to green energy in the export constrained areas but not for
green energy in the import constrained area, while the producers
in the import constrained area are more likely to improve
competition, and more likely to be able to bring their green
energy to ﬁnal consumers. Counter-trading is therefore not likely
to induce green energy producers to invest in the right location,
and arguably not the most efﬁcient strategy to bring about a more
sustainable society.Acknowledgements
Justin Dijk acknowledges ﬁnancial support of Essent N.V.
(provided through the Tilec-Essent co-operation project). Bert
Willems is the recipient of a Marie Curie Intra European Fellow-
ship (PIEF-GA-2008-221085). He thanks the Electricity Policy
Group at Cambridge University for its hospitality. Both authors
thank Georgios Petropoulos for comments and suggestions.Appendix I. Nash equilibria of counter-trading bids
Under counter-trading, the incumbent and the entrant in the
export constrained area will place ‘cost bids’ indicating their
willingness to produce. We denote the bids of the entrant and
the incumbent by BE and BI , respectively. The ﬁrm that has the
lowest bids will be allowed to export K units of electricity to the
import constrained area. The other ﬁrm will receive a compensa-
tion for not being able to supply equal to ðpBÞK , with B equal to
its bid, and p the price in the import constrained area. If a tie
occurs (they both submit an equal bid), we assume that the more
efﬁcient entrant will produce. We will now derive the best
response correspondence for the incumbent and the entrant in a
bidding game.
For BEocI , the incumbent’s best response correspondence is to
bid slightly above the entrant: BI ¼ BEþe, with e very small, since
in this case he receives a compensation of pðBEþeÞ4pcI for
every unit of electricity produced by the entrant. For, BE ¼ cI the
incumbent’s best response correspondence is to also bid BI ¼ cI ,
the entrant will produce, and the incumbent receives the com-
pensation pcI . For BE4cI , the incumbent’s best response corre-
spondence is to undercut the entrant by bidding BIoBE, in doing
so deterring entrance, and receiving pcI for every unit produced.
For BIocE, the entrant’s best response correspondence is to bid
just above the incumbent, BE ¼ BIþe, since it will then receive a
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response correspondence is to also bid BE ¼ cE, as the more
efﬁcient ﬁrm will produce, and receive pcE. For BI4cE, the
entrant’s best response correspondence is to bid BEoBI , thereby
undercutting the incumbent and receiving pcE for every unit
produced.
Hence, any pair of bids ðBE,BIÞ for which cErBErcI and
BI ¼ BEþe is a Nash equilibrium in this framework. In this case,
the incumbent receives a compensation of ðpðBEþeÞÞK for not
being able to supply the K units of electricity to the market. The
entrant will make a production proﬁt of ðpcEÞK in equilibrium.
For receiving this proﬁt the entrant paid an entry cost F.
There is a large set of possible Nash equilibria. In the remain-
der of the paper we assume that the ﬁrms coordinate on the
equilibrium that is Pareto dominant, i.e. ðBE ¼ cE,BI ¼ cEþeÞ. The
price in the export constrained zone is then given by p ¼ cE.16 Note that the entrant does not have an incentive to arbitrage between the
day ahead market price pDA and the price in the counter-trading market p , as it
would only reduce its proﬁt.Appendix II. Proﬁt maximization of the oligopolistic
incumbent
This appendix derives the regional prices under counter-
trading before and after entry occurred, and shows that the
incentives for the incumbent do not change. We consider an
incumbent monopoly, active in both the import and export
constrained area, a fringe generator with supply function SF ðpÞ
in the import constrained area, and an inelastic level of demand in
the import constrained area. We introduce the fringe generator
here, as this ﬁrm is more likely than consumers to react to prices
on short notice, and to arbitrage between the day-ahead market
and the counter-trading market. The proﬁt maximization problem
of the incumbent, before entry occurs is
max
Q ,qI ,p
pðQþqIÞCQcIqI
subject to
p¼ pðQþqIÞ, qIrK ð4Þ
Here, Q is the amount produced by the incumbent in the
import constrained area (after counter-trading has taken place),
while qI denotes the supply of the incumbent in the export
constrained area. The inverse demand function pðÞ represents
the residual demand function the incumbent faces in the import
constrained area. The price is determined by setting total (inelas-
tic) demand QD equal to the sum of imports K , the (elastic) supply
by a fringe ﬁrm in the import constrained area SF ðpÞ, and the
production of the incumbent in the import constrained area Q:
SF ðPÞþKþQ ¼QD
This can be rewritten as
p¼ pðQþKÞ ¼ S1F ðQDQKÞ
Maximizing proﬁts using the ﬁrst order conditions gives
puðQþkÞðQþkÞþpðQþkÞ ¼ C ð5Þ
where we assume that the line is sufﬁciently small, so that it is
congested qI ¼ k¼ K .
Now consider the proﬁt maximization problem of the incum-
bent when entry occurs. This is slightly more complex as we have
to take into account both the day-ahead market and the balancing
market. The incumbent’s proﬁt is the revenue in the day-ahead
market, plus the revenue from selling extra power in the import
constrained area, minus the revenue it loses for being con-
strained-off in the export constrained area, minus production
costs
p¼ pDAðQDAþQDAÞþpðQQDAÞpQDACQwhere pDA is the day ahead price, p the price in the import
constrained area after counter-trading, and p the price in the
export constrained area. QDA and QDA are the quantities sold in
the day-ahead market in the import constrained and the export
constrained areas, respectively, and Q is the ﬁnal production level
of the incumbent in the import constrained area.
In the import constrained area, the price is determined by the
inverse demand function
p¼ pðQþKÞ ¼ S1F ðQDQKÞ
In the export constrained area, only the (competitive) entrant
will beproducing. The price in the export constrained area is
p ¼ cE
The price in the day-ahead market pDA is determined by an
arbitrage condition. Fringe producers will only sell in the day-
ahead market, if they receive the same price in the day-ahead
market, as in thecounter-trading market. Therefore
pDA ¼ p
If this would not be the case, then the fringe producers would
reduce their supply in the day-ahead market, and increase their
net sales in the counter-trading market until the equation is
satisﬁed.16
The program of the incumbent then simpliﬁes to
max
pDA,p,p
QDA,QDA*,Q
p¼ pQCQþðpDApÞQDAþðpDAp*ÞQDA*
subject to
p ¼ cE, p¼ pðQþKÞ, pDA ¼ p
QDA*rK
Substituting the constraints we ﬁnd the following optimiza-
tion problem:
max
Q
pðQþKÞQCQþðpðQþKÞcEÞK
In the day-ahead market, the monopolist will set QDA* ¼ K in
the export constrained area, as this will maximize the counter-
trading payments it receives. The monopolist is indifferent about
the quantity it sets in the import constrained area given perfect
arbitrage. Hence, QDA is not uniquely determined.
Maximizing proﬁts using the ﬁrst order conditions now gives
puðQþKÞQþpðQþKÞþpuðQþKÞK ¼ C ð6Þ
When comparing the two ﬁrst order conditions (6) and (5), we
ﬁnd that they are identical. Hence, the incumbent in the import
constrained area will not change its behavior on the spot market
post-entry. Therefore, the post-entry price level remains the same
in our model.
Summarizing, the entrant and the incumbent both submit bids
in the day-ahead market to produce K units in the export
constrained area. The incumbent also submits bids in the import
constrained area. It could for instance submit a bid to produce
QK. During counter-trading, the incumbent will receive pay-
ments to reduce production with K units in the export con-
strained area, and be paid the price p to increase production with
K units in the import constrained area.
We derived this model for an incumbent monopoly and a
fringe generator. A similar result can be derived for standard
oligopoly models. As counter-trading refunds ﬁrms for lost
market share, they will not become more competitive after entry
occurs.
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Fig. 5. When is it socially optimal to subsidize entry?
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subsidies
A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for entry subsidies to be
welfare improving is that private incentives alone will lead to
under-investments. This happens if the private incentives (of the
entrant) to enter are smaller than the social incentives. In this
appendix, we ﬁrst derive when it is optimal to subsidize entrants,
if demand is linear. For non-linear demand, we are unable to
derive general conditions, as those will typically depend on the
precise shape of the demand function over a whole range of
prices. However, for small entry levels, the demand can be
approximated by a linear function, and the results for linear
demand are generally valid for small levels of entry. Such a linear
approximation is not valid if a single entrant captures a large
fraction of the market. In the last part of this appendix, we
therefore report numerical simulation results for constant elasti-
city demand functions and show for which types of entry
subsidies would be optimal. The results for linear demand func-
tions seem to carry over to other classes of demand functions.
The entrant will enter the market as long as its short term
proﬁt outweighs the investment costs:
Fr ðpAcEÞkE
where pA is the price after, cE is the marginal cost, kE is the
production, and F is the ﬁxed cost of the entrant.
From a society viewpoint the entrant should invest as long as
Fr Dp
2 Duj j
2
þðCcEÞkE ð7Þ
where F is the ﬁxed entry cost of the entrant and Dp the difference
between the price before (pB) and after entry (pA). The second
term represents the size of the reduction in deadweight loss
(competitive effect), and the third term is the increase in producer
surplus (efﬁciency gain). In order to calculate the competitive
effect, we assume that the demand function is linear.
We assume that there are n symmetric incumbent Cournot
ﬁrms in the import constrained area that have similar marginal
costs C, and that the entrant is competitive and always produces
at maximal capacity kE. The price–cost margins before and after
entry are then given by the following ﬁrst order conditions:
pBC ¼
DðpBÞ
n Duj j ð8Þ
pAC ¼
DðpAÞkE
n Duj j ð9Þ
In the post entry condition, kE is subtracted from the total level
of demand to obtain the residual demand for the incumbent
ﬁrm(s) in the import constrained area. Subtracting both equations
we ﬁnd the price effect of entry17
Dp¼ pBpA ¼
kE
ðnþ1Þ Duj j ð10Þ
The price effect is proportional to the size of investments by
the entrant, is smaller when the market has more ﬁrms (n), and if
demand is more elastic (large Duj j). Subsidizing entry is justiﬁed if
the private incentives to invest are smaller than the social
incentives
Dp2 Duj j
2
Z ðpACÞkE ð11Þ
Replacing Dp and pAC with the expressions (9) and (10), we
ﬁnd that subsidizing entry can only be socially optimal if the size17 We thank a referee for highlighting a mistake in an earlier derivation of this
equation.of the entrant is sufﬁciently large:
kE
DðpAÞ
Z
ðnþ1Þ2
ðnþ1Þ2þ1
ð12Þ
The critical minimal size depends on the number of incumbent
ﬁrms present in the market, and the size of market demand. For
instance, if there are two ﬁrms active in the import constrained
area, the entry decision of the entrant will only be optimal, if the
entrant takes up at least 90% of total electricity demand in the
post-entry regime. If the total level of entry is less than this
critical value, it is not optimal to subsidize entry, as it will lower
overall welfare. Note that if we assume that the entrant would
have a higher marginal cost than the incumbent ﬁrm, then it is
even less likely that entry is going to be welfare improving.
Hence, in our stylized model, small entrants will have the
wrong long term signals for entry and entrants with high invest-
ment costs may enter the market too often.This does not mean
that small levels of entry will always reduce welfare. Entrants
with a low investment cost will improve overall welfare by
entering the market, but they do not require a subsidy to do so.
Note that Eq. (12) is valid only for linear demand functions.
However, if entry is small, we can take a linear approximation of
the demand function, and it will therefore never be optimal to
subsidize a (very) small entrant. The intuition for this is that the
competitive effect (LHS of Eq. (11)) is a second order effect as it
depends on Dp2, while the private beneﬁt (RHS of Eq. (11)) is a
ﬁrst order effect depending on kE.
For non-linear demand, we cannot derive general conditions
for when subsidizing entry is socially optimal or not. We there-
fore illustrate our results with numerical simulations, assuming
constant elasticity demand functions (DðpÞ ¼ apn with no0), for
different levels of market concentration and pre-merger competi-
tiveness. Fig. 5 shows the market share a single competitive
entrant should at least obtain for entry subsidies to be socially
optimal. The horizontal axis measures the degree of market
power before entry as the price–cost ratio.18 The ﬁgure shows
that for large ranges of market conditions, subsidizing entry is not
optimal. Subsidizing entry is more likely to improve social18 We calibrated the demand elasticities to the pre-entry price–cost margins,
and then compared the private incentives of entry with the social optimum.
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ﬁrms are active, and the pre-merger price–cost margin is larger.
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